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Short Report
Prescribed Optimism
Is It Right to Be Wrong About the Future?
David A. Armor,1 Cade Massey,2 and Aaron M. Sackett3
1Department of Psychology, SanDiego State University; 2School of Management, Yale University; and 3Graduate School of
Business, University of Chicago
Personal predictions are often optimistically biased. This simple
observation has troubling implications for psychologists, econ-
omists, and decision theorists concerned with rationality and the
accuracy of self-knowledge (Armor & Taylor, 2002; Krizan &
Windschitl, 2007; Sweeny, Carroll, & Shepperd, 2006). How-
ever, normative conclusions about the impropriety of optimistic
bias rest on an untested assumption: that people desire to be
accurate when making personal predictions. If people believe,
rightly or wrongly, that unrealistic optimism has some value,
then optimistic bias may be usefully understood as being con-
sistent with people’s values and beliefs.
METHOD
To investigate this issue, we examined people’s beliefs about the
kinds of predictions (accurate, optimistic, or pessimistic) they
and others ought to make. Specifically, we asked participants
(N 5 383) to imagine one of four different settings in which
predictions (a) would be relevant and (b) might range from overly
pessimistic to overly optimistic. These settings, chosen for
breadth, included decisions about a financial investment, an
academic-award application, a surgical procedure, and a dinner
party. For each setting, we created eight vignettes by indepen-
dently manipulating three variables known to be related to op-
timism: commitment (whether the decision to engage in a
particular action has or has not been made; Armor & Taylor,
2003), agency (whether the decision to commit was, or will be,
made by the protagonist or by another person; Henry, 1994), and
control (the degree to which the protagonist can influence the
predicted outcome; Klein & Helweg-Larsen, 2002).1 Each
participant was randomly assigned to one setting and received
all eight vignettes, in counterbalanced order, within that setting.
One third of participants (n 5 127) were asked to provide
prescriptions (i.e., to indicate whether it would be best to be
overly pessimistic, accurate, or overly optimistic) for each of the
eight vignettes. In order to have descriptive benchmarks for these
prescriptions, we asked another third of participants (n 5 128)
to indicate what kind of prediction the protagonist in each vi-
gnette would make, and the final third (n5 128) to indicate what
kind of prediction they themselves would make. Response op-
tions ranged from4 (extremely pessimistic) through 0 (accurate)
to14 (extremely optimistic). After responding to all vignettes, par-
ticipants were asked to complete a measure of dispositional op-
timism (the Life Orientation Test–Revised, or LOT-R; Scheier,
Carver, & Bridges, 1994) and questions about age, gender, and
ethnicity.
RESULTS
Analyses revealed three principal results.
Prescribed Optimism
Participants clearly prescribed optimism. Those asked to pro-
vide prescriptions recommended predictions that were opti-
mistic (M 5 1.12), t(124) 5 10.36, prep > .99, d 5 0.93.
Optimistically biased predictions were prescribed in each of the
eight vignette conditions, all ts > 1.95, all preps > .87 (see
Table 1). Overall, the modal prescription was moderately opti-
mistic (12 on our scale), which was endorsed nearly twice as
often as accurate (32.3% vs. 17.7%).
Described Optimism
Participants asked to describe the predictions of other people
(i.e., of the protagonists in the vignettes) reported that people
tend to be optimistically biased (M 5 0.82), t(122) 5 8.91,
prep > .99, d 5 0.80. Participants asked to describe their own
prediction tendencies also reported being optimistically biased
(M5 0.82), t(126)5 6.39, prep> .99, d5 0.56. The degrees of
bias participants attributed to other people and to themselves
did not differ, F < 1.0, n.s.
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People Are Not Optimistic Enough
Finally, and most strikingly, participants indicated that people
should be even more optimistic than they are. Even though
participants described other people and themselves as opti-
mistically biased, they prescribed more optimism than they
described (Mdiff 5 0.29), t(373) 5 2.16, prep 5 .94, d 5 0.24.
Robustness Checks
These principal results were robust across our commitment,
agency, and control manipulations. The manipulations did,
however, have main effects on prescribed and described opti-
mism (see Table 1). Participants prescribed (and described)
more optimism (a) after commitment to a course of action (M5
1.24) rather than before (M5 0.61), F(1, 372)5 136.19, prep>
.99; (b) when the decision to commit was the protagonist’s to
make (M5 1.04) rather than not (M5 0.80),F(1, 372)5 22.81,
prep > .99; and (c) when the protagonist’s control over the out-
come was high (M5 1.34) rather than low (M5 0.51),F(1, 372)5
151.47, prep > .99. These main effects are consistent with the
findings of previous research on moderators of optimism and
thus serve as validity checks for our prescriptive and descriptive
measures.
The results were also largely robust across the settings we
sampled. Participants (a) prescribed optimism over accuracy in
all four settings (preps > .95), (b) described other people as
optimistically biased in all settings (preps > .87), (c) described
themselves as optimistically biased in all but the award setting
(three of four preps> .99), and (d) prescribed more optimism than
they described in all but the investment setting (three of four
preps > .64).
Finally, our principal results were robust across key measured
variables. Interestingly, even participants who were self-iden-
tified as pessimists on the LOT-R (i.e., participants whose av-
erage responses to this measure were below the scale’s midpoint)
prescribed optimism (M 5 0.87), t(21) 5 2.91, prep 5 .96.
Furthermore, although Asian participants prescribed less opti-
mism than any other ethnic group, t(123)5 1.75, prep5 .84, they
still prescribed optimism (M 5 0.72), t(22) 5 2.46, prep 5 .92.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Prescriptions provide a novel standard for evaluating the quality
of personal forecasts. In contrast to the conventional standard of
unbiased predictions, people’s prescriptions suggest that they
believe optimistically biased predictions are ideal. Although the
results from this study do not permit conclusions about the
wisdom of these prescriptions (i.e., whether it actually is better
to be optimistic than accurate), they do challenge the prevailing
assumption that people’s primary goal is to be accurate. These
results suggest that optimistic biases may be more than just an
unwanted and unintended consequence of motivated reasoning
(Kunda, 1990), basic cognitive processes (Buehler, Griffin, &
Ross, 2002), or evolutionary forces (Haselton & Nettle, 2006).
People appear to recognize that their predictions are biased and
that these predictions deviate from an ideal standard. The sur-
prising conclusion, though, is that people believe this deviation
is due to predictions not being optimistic enough.
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Supplementary Material
The following supplementary material is available for this article
Appendix S1. Vignettes
This material is available as part of the on-line article from:
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2008.02089.x
(This link will take you to the article’s abstract.)
Please note: Blackwell Publishing is not responsible for the
content or functionality of any supplementary materials sup-
plied by the authors. Any queries (other than missing material)
should be directed to the corresponding author for the article.
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